



DE-RADICALISATION IN INDONESIA:  
DISCOURSES AND STRATEGIES 
 





This article traces the convergence of counter-terrorism strategies and de-
radicalisation discourses in Indonesia. Key zones of contestation include 
the classroom with young impressionable pupils, modern society with 
alienated and dislocated citizens, prison cellblocks with fertile grounds for 
the spread of radical and pathological ideas, and new media with near-
unlimited scope for the diffusion of knowledge. As in any country, 
Indonesia’s challenge to terror is imperfect and subject to reversals. 
Counter-terrorism is a means to limit, manage and mitigate terror. Very 
few claim to be able to eradicate such a threat. Beyond lethal force, there 
are reflexive, subtle, innovative strategies at the disposal of the Indonesian 
authorities. Given the constant friction between civil liberties and 
democratic rights on the one hand, and security imperatives on the other, 
governing authorities and policymakers are advised to continue 
consolidating political reforms that began in the transition of May 1998. 
 






In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 World Trade Centre 
and Pentagon attacks, Christopher Hitchens (2002) correctly noted that the 
ceaseless deployment of the word terrorism had a suffocating effect. 
Fatigued lexicographers struggled to rescue the word from overly-induced 
political statements, ambiguous editorials, hypocritical policy 
pronouncements and the misguided essentialism of what Mamdani 
(2002:766) termed as ‘culture talk’. Despite these reservations, Hitchens 
(2002) portrayed terrorism as an extension of nihilism, with terrorists 
being irrational, cruel and vicious, fanatically demanding the impossible at 
gunpoint or knife-edge. It is important therefore to rescue the term from 
obscurity, to retain it as an important instrument of condemnation. 
 
 
Some scholars refuse outright to engage in terror debates, 
dissatisfied with the loaded nature of the term. Professor Duncan 
McCargo, for instance, specialises in the southern Thai conflict. In a 
Guardian column in 2009 McCargo discussed the bloody violence and 
insurgency at length without once using the term terrorism. This column 
generated 87 online responses from enlightened readers, and terrorism 
rapidly became the focal point of the discussion. One respondent pleaded 
(unsuccessfully) with McCargo to ‘show some honesty and state that he 
doesn’t support the murderous terrorists who are destroying southern 
Thailand’. 
As a point of departure, the professional discourse in Southeast 
Asia has gradually shifted from terrorism to the clinical study of radicals, 
radicalism and lengthy processes of de-radicalisation. Islam remains at the 
centre of the debate, a focal point of reference at all levels. Reacting to 
increasingly derogatory caricatures of Islam filtering out of influential 
Western media and literature, Chandra Muzaffar (2009:1) warns of 
‘ignorance compounded by prejudice’ and ‘aversion alloyed with 
antagonism’. A critical look at the ideational battleground reinforces the 
fact that simplistic dichotomous categories of good Muslims versus bad 
Muslims are not very helpful. Rather, one should strive for the sort of 
agonising introspection and deepening of knowledge that Booth and 
Dunne (2002) advocate. This should begin with a survey of scholarly work 
on Islam in Southeast Asia, starting with Hefner’s (2000) civil Islam, for 
instance, and advancing to discursive contests such as Rahim’s (2006) 
liberal Islam versus literal Islam. 
Beyond military metrics and spectacle wars, secret intelligence 
and elite policing, there is a highly-contested discursive sphere that 
deserves further attention. This article therefore traces the convergence of 
counter-terrorism strategies and de-radicalisation discourses in Indonesia. 
Key zones of contestation include the classroom with young 
impressionable pupils, modern society with alienated and dislocated 
citizens, prison cellblocks with fertile grounds for the spread of radical and 
pathological ideas, and new media with near-unlimited scope for the 
diffusion of knowledge. Such an investigation benefits from the recent 
work of Abrahms (2008) on infiltration strategies, and Sidney Jones 
(2010) on the dangers of Indonesia’s ‘word warriors’, those non-violent 
radicals who frequently fall under the radar and are difficult to contain. 
 
 
Terrorism is a Loaded Term 
 
Not all observers agree with Hitchens (2002) about the 
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Terrorism is a Loaded Term 
 
Not all observers agree with Hitchens (2002) about the 
fundamental irrationality of terrorists. A glut of recent studies and research 
                            
projects have sought to reveal the ‘strategic logic’ of suicide terrorism 
(Pape 2003), the ‘geometry’ of terrorism (Black 2004), the ‘motives for 
martyrdom’ (Moghadam 2008-09) and the ‘organisational capabilities’ of 
terrorist groups (Horowitz 2010). The moral relativism of the terror debate 
is captured by Noam Chomsky (2002), who goes to great lengths to 
distinguish between the terrorism of the weak and the terrorism of the 
powerful (usually read as state-sponsored terror). The pirate’s maxim is 
used to illustrate Chomsky’s main argument: when a pirate in a small 
vessel attacks the sea it is the act of a thief, whereas a powerful ruler can 
invade the whole world with naval force and be celebrated as an emperor. 
Terrorism is generally argued to be a weapon of the weak (asymmetric 
power), an act perpetrated by individuals or groups against civilian targets 
for specific purposes (usually symbolic, often political). Provoking an 
overreaction or frenzied response has emerged as perhaps the key 
objective of terrorism (Zakaria 2010). 
The imperfect process of countering terrorism and defending 
against radicalism requires flexible strategies that are considered an art by 
some and a science by others. There is no panacea or magical formula, so 
we do our best to cope with and adjust to this new age of ‘sacred terror’ 
(Rapoport 1984). The best general strategy for Indonesia is to strengthen 
democratic institutions and continue to devolve authority to the outer 
provinces to ensure political legitimacy, redistribute wealth and quell 
unrest. Sydney Jones (2008) calls for an integrated de-radicalisation 
programme, directing attention towards the Indonesian courts, the police, 
prison systems, schoolhouses and new media outlets, and warns against the 
establishment of a repressive Malaysian-style Internal Security Act. 
In an ongoing discursive contest, Indonesian authorities continue 
to enlist properly vetted Islamic leaders and Muslim scholars with 
‘epistemic authority’ to dispel myths, counter radical teachings and 
dismantle extremist ideologies (Kruglanski et al. 2010). By logical 
extension, this war of words is taking place in the classroom, and 
Indonesian authorities have long been targeting Islamic boarding schools 
such as al-Mukmin and Darusy Syahadah (Pikiran Rakyat 2009). There 
are also spontaneous initiatives by civil Islamic organisations such as 
Nahdlatul Ulama aimed at countering distorted teachings and promoting 
‘true’ religious values and model citizens (Sijabat 2010). Not all counter-
terrorism measures are quite so quaint, of course. The killing of three bank 
robbers on 19 September 2010 with suspected links to terror groups in 
Medan by Densus 88 (Indonesia’s elite counter-terrorism unit) 
demonstrates that a grand integrated strategy requires both lethal force and 
gradual de-radicalisation. Table A below demonstrates just how prevalent 
terrorism has been in recent years. From Aceh and Solo in Indonesia to 
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Islam has been grabbing headlines, confounding policymakers and security 
forces alike. Friction between civil liberties and democratic rights on the 
one hand, and security imperatives on the other, is constant. 
 
Table A – Chronology of Terrorist Bombings in Indonesia 
 
Date of Bombing Particulars 
1 August 2000 Philippines Embassy in Jakarta 
27 August 2000 Malaysian Embassy complex in Jakarta 
[no fatalities] 
13 September 2000 Jakarta Stock Exchange 
24 December 2000 Christmas Eve bombings in Jakarta, West Java 
(Bekasi, Sukabumi, Bandung), East Java 
(Mojokerto), Nusa Tenggara Barat (Mataram), 
Sumatra (Medan, Pematang, Siantar), Batam, Riau 
(Pekanbaru) 
23 September 2001 Atrium Plaza Senen, Jakarta 
12 October 2001 KFC restaurant, Makassar [no fatalities] 
6 November 2001 Australian International School, Pejaten, Jakarta 
[no fatalities] 
1 January 2002 New Years bomb outside of a chicken restaurant in 
Jakarta  
12 October 2002 Kuta and the American Consulate in Denpassar, 
Bali 
5 December 2002 McDonalds in Makassar, South Sulawesi 
3 February 2003 Police headquarters, Wisma Bhayangkan, Jakarta 
[no fatalities] 
27 April 2003 Terminal 2F, Soekarno-Hatta International Airport 
5 August 2003 JW Marriot Hotel Jakarta 
10 January 2004 Cafe Bukit Sampoddo Indah, Palopo, South 
Sulawesi 
26 July 2004 General Elections Commission, Jakarta  
[no fatalities] 
9 September 2004 Australian Embassy in Jakarta 
12 December 2004 Church of Immanuel, Palu, Central Sulawesi  
[no fatalities] 
21 March 2005 Two bombings in Ambon, Eastern Indonesia 
1 October 2005 Kuta and Jimbaran, Bali 
31 December 2005 Marketplace in Palu, Central Sulawesi 
11 November 2006 A&W restaurant, East Jakarta 
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Total of 22 terrorist bombings, 296 fatalities 
 
 
Psychopathology and Prison Islam 
 
Pathological personalities are said to be drawn to terrorism, along 
with those experiencing social alienation, geographical displacement, and 
especially those who are widowed. Therefore the importance of group 
solidarity and shared ideology in developing strong affective ties with 
fellow terrorists is absolute (Crenshaw 2000; Abrahms 2008). So what is 
to be done? Beyond the sledgehammer method (lethal force and coercion) 
a more nuanced approach has been called for to reduce terrorism’s social 
utility and attack the social bonds at the core of all such groups. Indeed, 
the goal of most modern de-radicalisation programmes has been to drive a 
wedge between members of an organisation by infiltration, breeding 
internal mistrust and resentment. One specific strategy has been to work 
with prisoners in order to cultivate a new group of informants and double-
agents. 
According to data compiled by the International Crisis Group, the 
majority of Indonesian men convicted of radical Islamic terrorism are held 
in Java (Cipinang prison Jakarta, Kedungpane prison Semarang, Kalisosok 
prison Porong), Bali (Kerobokan prison), and South Sulawesi (Makassar). 
Records from October 2007 showed 124 men arrested for terrorism, half of 
whom were considered Jemaah Islamiyah members. One obvious dilemma 
is whether to treat convicted terrorists separately from other inmates. ICG 
(2007) found that integration is better than segregation based on an 
analysis of solidarity-building and recruitment opportunities. Though the 
implementation of de-radicalisation programmes is highly secretive, and 
the new recruits anonymous, we know that the focus is usually either 
ideological or behavioural. Ideological efforts are about renouncing 
violence (attitudinal modification), while behavioural modification is 
about disengagement (Horgan 2008). 
The dominant Indonesian approach from 2000 onwards has been 
creeping de-radicalisation. This ‘soft approach’ involves efforts to build 
extensive webs of paid informants and former militants, with the 
expectation that they can help persuade radical hardliners to change their 
ways through discursive efforts and material incentives. An obvious 
limitation to this approach is that former prisoners are regarded with 
suspicion and struggle to infiltrate radical groups. Moreover, prisoners that 
are granted early release are often inclined to renew their subversive 
activities and rejoin militant movements. One example was the prisoner, 





M. Top (now deceased) after being released from prison in March 2007. 
De-radicalisation is incremental and subject to reversals such as the 
devastating July 2009 suicide bombings of the JW Marriott and Ritz 
Carlton hotels in Jakarta. Nevertheless, cautious observers still believe that 
creeping de-radicalisation is paying dividends. 
 
 
The Ideational Battleground 
 
One area that deserves careful and sustained scrutiny is the 
ideational battle being fought simultaneously on multiple fronts – inside 
prisons and classrooms, through new media, on the streets, and in the 
powerful corridors of officialdom. Mahmood Mamdani (2002) spoke out 
against the political campaign to reduce counter-terrorism to a civil war 
between good Muslims and bad Muslims, whereby the latter must be 
quarantined and ultimately exorcised. We are certainly free to object to the 
argument that there is a simple fault line dividing moderate, genuine Islam 
from radical extremist Islam. It must be recognised, however, that it is 
standard practice throughout Southeast Asia for authorities and media to 
deploy what are presented as moderate Islamic discourses in the effort to 
counter deviant teachings and transgressors. De-radicalisation is rather 
more complex, involving efforts to synthesise the ethics of Islam with 
various fields of modern thought, and to purge corrupt teachings and 
textual misreading by infiltrating schools, prisons and social forums. 
Radicalism is generally associated with ‘pure’ Islam (Wahhabism, 
Salafism) and calls for a return to the straight path (as-sirat al-mustaqim) 
of original Islam. It is also a derivative of ‘literal’ Islam based on absolute 
shari’a, striving to create a secure area for Islamic life and law, where 
Islam is religion and regime (din wa-dawla). From these very basic 
precepts a cross-pollination of Indonesian extremists emerge from groups 
such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, Darul Islam, Laskar 
Jihad and Front Pembela Islam (Hasan 2007). 
Moderate beliefs, teachings and practices are associated with 
forms of ‘liberal’ Islam, usually eclectic, sometimes tolerant of Sufism, 
and ‘civil’ Islam that is supportive of democracy and the separation of 
mosque and state (Hefner 2000). In addition, a type of ‘silent’ shari’a 
exists whereby a degree of flexibility is granted to believers and 
practitioners, and certain issues are intentionally left for humans to resolve. 
A similar convergence of moderate individuals and groups occurs, for 
instance, within and between members of Nahdlatul Ulama, 
Muhammadiyah, Jaringan Islam Liberal and Majelis Ulama Indonesia. The 
juxtaposition of moderate and radical has been widely criticised as overly 
simplistic, ossified and compartmentalised (Laffan 2003; Hamilton-Hart 
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2005; Renwick 2007). Indeed, it is argued that these two broad categories 
are not impervious, and that sensationalised portrayals of radical Islam 
disconnected from the mass of ordinary Muslims is distorting (Kolig 
2005). There is a vast ideological spectrum in which radical ideas are 
integrated and blended in. 
One of the most comprehensive efforts to dispel myths and correct 
popular misconceptions of the Islamic faith is Esposito’s (2002) Unholy 
War. This book carefully examines concepts such as hijra and jihad, 
concepts that are used selectively by radicals and extremist ‘holy warriors’ 
to serve particular purposes and agendas. Jihad is by origin a prophetic 
call to people to reform their communities and live a good life based on 
religious belief (Esposito 2002:30). A defensive conception of jihad 
appears in the earliest Quranic verses in response to the hijra – forced 
emigration from hostile un-Islamic environments. Verse 22:39, for 
instance, grants leave to those who were wrongly expelled from their 
homes to fight, while verse 2:190 instructs that they must ‘fight in the way 
of God with those who fight you, but aggress not: God loves not the 
aggressors’. 
Discursive battles continue over the correct and precise readings 
of Quranic injunctions that provide detailed guidelines and regulations for 
the conduct of war. Some examples include verses 48:17 and 9:91 
regarding who can fight and who is exempted, verse 2:192 about the 
cessation of hostilities, verse 47:4 on how prisoners should be treated, and 
verse 2:294 concerning proportionality in war. Several injunctions set out 
a mandate for peace (verses 8:61 and 4:90), while others address holy 
martyrdom (verses 3:157 and 3:169). Esposito (2002:30-33) concludes that 
it is forbidden to kill non-combatants, women and children, monks and 
rabbis, meaning that all are given the promise of immunity unless they had 
taken part in the fighting. With the expansion of Muslim communities, 
religious scholars (ulama, the learned) developed the shari’a, an Islamic 
law seen as the ideal blueprint for Muslim life (Esposito 2002:34). Over 
the ages, when Muslim rulers declared and conducted jihad, legal experts 
(muftis) provided legal opinions (fatwas) to legitimise or challenge jihad. 
In March 2010 a Pakistani cleric named Muhammad Tahir ul-Qadri joined 
in the race to discredit suicide terrorism by issuing a 600-page fatwa that 
supposedly ‘leaves not a single stone unturned’ (Al Jazeera 2010). 
 
 
De-radicalisation and Re-education 
 
In Indonesia there are plenty of word warriors competing for 
media attention, funding and influence in an ongoing discursive contest. 





(ustadz) based in Central Java, has long posed a dilemma for Indonesian 
authorities. One dilemma is censorship versus rightful expression in a 
legal, democratic context (Kolig 2005). Though Ba’asyir’s views are 
noxious, bigoted and could possibly have residual effects (violence), it is 
widely held that they must not be met with authoritarian repression. This 
would undermine democratic achievements, legal mechanisms, and drive 
such ideas underground, leading to dangerous subterranean movements. 
After a series of arrests and linkages to the Bali bombings, Ba’asyir has 
been released and formed a new organisation called Jamaah Ansharud 
Tauhid, one that is above-ground and non-violent, though still rejects 
democracy and calls for immediate implementation of shari’a (ICG 2009).
 Indonesian authorities typically rely on pragmatic strategies of 
intelligence gathering and policing, which are intended to compliment de-
radicalisation and re-education programmes aimed at inoculating 
vulnerable groups against extremist ideology (ICG 2007). This involves 
enlisting the help of trusted or acceptable religious leaders to engage with 
and counter radical indoctrination and perverse notions of jihad. 
Controversially, counter-terrorism officials have been known to hold 
garden barbeques with convicted terrorists, offering them and their 
families reduced prison sentences, cash payments and health care in return 
for cooperation. After extensive assessment and clinical study, intelligence 
officers have determined that the perpetrators of terrorist acts such as the 
Bali bombings were ‘sincere in their beliefs, yet sincerely ignorant’ 
(Tumanggor 2007). They did not allow alternative discourses to challenge 
their convictions, which were based on religious distortions. 
As a preventative measure, trusted religious figureheads are being 
sent out to schools, mosques and social forums, focusing on pesantrens, 
pondoks and madrasahs in order to reverse dangerous misperceptions. 
Beyond such ‘travelling roadshows’ authorities have made innovative use 
of new media and focused on youth activities (ICG 2007). It has been 
determined that many centres of learning are independent and family-
owned, designing their own curriculum free from any affiliations, political 
or otherwise. By contrast, a number of state-run pesantren (or those 
following the state curriculum) have been linked to terrorism. 
The triad of prison authorities, officially-sanctioned religious 
preachers and intelligence agents have been criticised for their narrow 
focus on jihad and rather thin re-education programme that has failed to 
achieve a lasting ideological transformation. By contrast, a surprising 
development has emerged following a severe rift within Jemaah Islamiyah 
that led to the creation of the Majelis Dakwah Umat Islam (MDUI). MDUI 
members have engaged in spontaneous public outreach in order to counter 
violent religious teachings and practices. This demands a much more in-
depth focus on faith in general, and MDUI stresses the importance of 
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that led to the creation of the Majelis Dakwah Umat Islam (MDUI). MDUI 
members have engaged in spontaneous public outreach in order to counter 
violent religious teachings and practices. This demands a much more in-
depth focus on faith in general, and MDUI stresses the importance of 
                            
appropriate levels of knowledge and enlightenment that are needed prior to 




Returning to Sidney Jones’s (2010) warning about Indonesia’s 
word warriors and the new wave of ‘jihad-by-the-pen’, a small number of 
non-violent radical groupings such as Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid remain 
elusive and difficult to contain. Ward (2009) reinforces this view, 
analysing the inflammatory but ultimately passive organisation Hizbut 
Tahrir Indonesia. These organisations actively campaign on Facebook, 
maintain internet websites, blogs and publishing companies, and openly 
distribute leaflets on the streets in major metropolitan centres. As a general 
rule, the current government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono prefers subtle 
co-optation to direct confrontation, and therefore, the continuation of a 
quiet policy of containment can be expected. 
As in any country, Indonesia’s challenge to terror is imperfect and 
subject to reversals. Counter-terrorism is a means to limit, manage, and 
mitigate terror. Very few claim to be able to eradicate such a threat. 
Beyond lethal force, there are reflexive, subtle, innovative strategies at the 
disposal of Indonesian authorities. Obvious pitfalls remain, however, as 
many convicts reject de-radicalisation, terror leadership remains elusive, 
and corruption continues within the ranks of police, military and 
government officials. Nevertheless the dangers of collective thinking will 
have to be rigorously challenged, and all stakeholders in counter-terrorism 
and de-radicalisation in Indonesia must continue to engage simplifications 
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